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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRANSPOWER MANUFACTURING, INC.,: 
a Utah corporation, and BEN V. 
HELSTEN, an individual, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
FREE-WING TURBINE CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, and LAIRD 
B. GOGINS, an individual, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
Supreme Court No. 19214 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a "judgment by confession" entered 
against the defendants Free-Wing Turbine Corporation and Laird 
B. Gogins (hereinafter referred to collectively as the 
"Defendants") without the filing of a complaint, without 
issuance or service of process and without hearing. Judgment 
was entered against the defendants as makers of a promissory 
note upon ex parte application to the court by Ben V. Helsten 
and Transpower Manufacturing (hereinafter referred to 
collectively as the "Plaintiffs"). 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment was entered against the defendants upon ~ 
parte application of the plaintiff on March 3, 1983. On April 
7, 1983, as s~on as possible after learning of the entry of the 
judgment, plaintiffs moved to set aside the judgment pursuant 
to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendants' motion was heard by the Honorable Judith Billings 
of the Third District Court on April 14, 1983. The court 
dictated its order and its findings into the record at that 
time and directed plaintiffs' counsel to prepare an order for 
the file. This order was signed by the court on April 22, 
1983. Pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts, the defendant objected to the form of. the 
order prepared by plaintiffs' counsel and defendants' 
objections were heard and sustained by the court on May 6, 
1983. As a result of the courts ruling of May 6, the parties 
stipulated to amend the judgment and the amended judgment was 
entered on May 12, 1983. Defendants filed their Notice of 
Appeal on May 11, 1983. Defendants appeal the judgment entered 
on March 3, 1983, and the amendments thereto entered on May 12, 
1983, as well as the lower courts denial of their motion to set 
aside the judgment. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
First and foremost, defendants seek an order vacating 
the judgment entered against them below. They also ask for an 
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,r,jer that Judgment cannot be entered against them on the note 
which is the subJect of this lawsuit without the filing of a 
r·.>mplaint, and the issuance and service of process to which 
defendants shall be given the customary right to respond. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Due to the nature of a judgment by confession it is 
difficult to make citations to the record as is required by 
Rule 75(p)(2)(d). Though defendants' counsel suggested the 
court should allow an evidentiary hearing on any defenses 
Jefendants might have before their motion to set aside the 
Judgment was denied (T. 16), none was given. It is therefore 
difficult to cite to the record regarding the facts; but, 
counsel believes the following is a fair statement of the 
background facts. 
Laird Gogins is the developer of a device known as the 
Free-Wing Turbine. This is a device which generates electrical 
power from the wind. Free-Turbine Corporation, a Utah 
corporation in which Laird Gogins is the principal stockholder, 
entered into a sales license agreement and license agreement 
with the plaintiff, Ben Helsten, to market these devices. It 
is defendants' understanding that Ben Helsten is a principal in 
franspower Manufacturing Inc. and Transpower Manufacturing is 
11e entity through which Ben Helsten is marketing these devices. 
Disputes subsequently arose between the parties as to 
wno was indebted to whom and in what amounts under the terms of 
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'"'! ( 4 I even i E the Judgment was proper iy entered in accordance 
, ,.,, :1·,e governing statute and was not vi,olative of the United 
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'"" tr.terest of Justice if relief from tne Judgment "'as oiranted 
1ccorJance with Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Defendants' motion to set aside the Judgment by 
~fess10n was denied by the Honorable Judith Billings of the 
"•rj District Court, 
Two more lawsuits growing out of the same 
·' .:1sact ions, occurrences and events leading up to this lawsuit 
••~ Leen filed in Third District Court. These lawsuits are: 
.· . .;;:___ 
i~elsten, and Transpower Manufacturing, Inc., vs. 
-'.>.113 Turbine Corporation, Laird B. Gogins, and John Does l 
·.!':__~, C1·nl N•::i. C83-2040 and Free-Wing Turbine 
r .J. ':. l __;n .1nd LairJ B. vs. Manuf"l.cturing, 
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Inc. and Ben V. Helsten, Civil No. C83-3001. Plaintiffs' 
counsel indicated that one of these lawsuits had been filed at 
the time of the hearing on defendants' motion to set aside the 
judgment (T. 26). It is anticipated that these lawsuits will 
be consolidated for trial. In these lawsuits, the parties ask 
for judgment against one another for sums in excess of 
$1,000,000. 
Under the judgment in this case, plaintiffs have 
attempted to execute on the interest Laird B. Gogins has in 
Free-Wing Turbine Corporation and, thereby, gain control of 
Free-Wing Turbine Corporation. Had this been accomplished, 
plaintiffs could have summarily short-circuited a large part of 
the other two lawsuits. Execution has been prevented only by 
posting the stock of Laird B. Gogins in Free-Wing Turbine 
Corporation as part of the supersedeas bond. If defendants 
lose on appeal, the stock may be forfeited and the other 
lawsuits may still be disposed of quickly by plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION WAS NOT ENTERED 
PURSUANT TO STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION. 
Judgment by confession finds statutory authorization 
in Utah in Utah Code Annotated § 78~22-3 which reads as follows: 
A judgment by confession may be entered 
without action, either for money due or to 
-6-
become due or secure any person against 
contingent liability on behalf of the 
defendant or both, in the manner prescribed 
by law. Such judgment may be entered in any 
court having jurisdiction for like amounts. 
The "manner prescribed by law'' is found in Rule 58 
A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads as 
follows: 
(E) Judgment by confession. Whenever 
judgment by confession is authorized by 
statute, the party seeking the same must 
file with the clerk of the court in which 
the judgment is to be entered a statement, 
verified by the defendant to the following 
effect; 
(1) if the judgment to be confessed is for 
money due or to become due, it shall 
concisely state the claim and that the sum 
confessed therefore is justly due or to 
become due; 
(2) if the judgment to be confessed is for 
the purpose of securing the plaintiff 
against a contingent liability, it must 
state concisely the claim and that the sum 
confessed therefore does not exceed the same; 
(3) it must authorize the entry of judgment 
for a specified sum. 
The Clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the 
statement and enter in the judgment docket, 
a judgment of the court for the amount 
confessed, with cost of entry, if any. 
Having recognized the harsh and overbearing nature of 
the remedy of judgment by confession, the Utah Court has held 
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that strict compliance with the law and the rules must be 
adhered to or any attempted confession of judgment is vo1~. 
Bacon v. Raybould, 4 Utah 357, 10 P. 481, aff'd £.1:1_ rehearing, 4 
Utah 357, 11 P. 510 (1886); Utah National Bank v. Sears, 13 
Utah 172, 44 P. 832 (1896); and Utah Association of Credit Men 
v. Jones, 49 Utah 519, 164 P. 1029 (1917). If the judgment is 
not entered in strict accordance with the statutory provisions, 
it is void: 
it has been uniformly held that a judgment 
by confession must conform strictly to the 
statute and can exist only by statutory 
authority. This court long ago maintained 
the doctrine that a judgment by confession, 
obtained in any other manner than that 
directed by our statutes is null and 
void . 
Utah National Bank v. Sears, 44 P. at 832-33. 
A. The ''Verified Statement For Judgment by Confession" 
Proferred b the Plaintiffs Did Not Meet The 
Requirements of Rule SSA e). 
An examination of the record will reveal a document 
entitled "Verified Statement For Judgment by Confession" dated 
March 2, 1983, and filed with the Clerk of Court on March 2, 
1983, at 4:49 P.M. One has to presume that this document was 
intended by the plaintiffs to meet the requirements of 58A(e). 
The title of the document alone should force one to conclude 
this. However, an examination of this document will reveal it 
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s 111~t :i verified statement "by the defendant" at all; it is a 
1er1f1ed statement of the plaintiffs and therefore it does not 
meet the requirements of Rule 58A(e). 
No one but the defendants could execute the verified 
statement required for a judgment by confession. Consider Utah 
National Bank v. Sears, 13 Utah 172, 44 P. 832 (1886). That 
case involved a promissory note which contained a warrant 
dUthorizing any attorney who was duly admitted to the bar of 
the United States or of any state to appear in any court and 
confess judgment against the maker of the note. A judgment was 
entered upon the verified statement of an attorney pursuant to 
che provisions of the Note but was set aside upon motion of the 
defendant. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
The sole contention in this case, as we view it, 
is, can such a warrant of attorney as is involved 
in this case authorize the creditor himself to 
enter judgment against his debtor? 
* * * 
We think the parties cannot, either by signature 
of one or by the signature of all to any kind of 
contract, vary the rules of procedure of courts 
expressly established by the Code. The only 
method of obtaining a judgment by confession in 
this state is the one pointed out by our statute. 
Comp. Laws §§ 3767-3770. The very object of 
enacting the Code was to confine parties, so far 
as legal procedure is concerned, to the method 
prescribed in the Code. Any defect in the 
proceeding, or material departure from the 
statutory provisions, would render a judgment 
absolutely void. 
lj. at 832-33. The Court required strict statutory compliance 
clnd held that there must be a verified statement by the debtor 
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himself and affirmed the lower court's vacation of the 
judgment. 1 
l Judgment by confession was then governed by ~~ 3767, 
3768, 3769 and 3770 of the Compiled Laws of Utah 1888. As 
counsel pointed out below, these previous statutes do not 
differ from the current statues in any material way. They read 
as follows: 
Sec. 3767. A judgment by confession may be entered with-
out action, either for money due or to become due or 
secure any person against contingent liability on behalf 
of the defendant, or both, in the manner prescribed by 
this chapter. Such judgment may be entered in any court 
having jurisdiction for like amounts. 
Sec. 3768. A statement in writing must be made, signed 
by the defendant and verified by his oath to the 
following effect: 
(1) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a 
specified sum. 
(2) If it be for money due, or to become due, it must 
state concisely the facts out of which it arose, and 
show that the sum confessed therefor is justly due or to 
become due; 
(3) If it be for the purpose of securing the plaintiff 
against a contingent liability, it must state concisely 
the facts constituting the liability, and show the sum 
confessed therefor does not exceed the same. 
Sec. 3769. The statement must be filed with the clerk 
of the court in which the judgment is to be entered, who 
must endorse upon it, and enter in the judgment book, a 
judgment of such court for the amount confessed, with 
five dollars cost. The statement and affidavit with the 
judgment endorsed, thereupon, becomes the judgment roll. 
Sec. 3770. In a justice's court, where the court has 
the authority to enter the judgment, the statement may 
be filed with the justice, who must thereupon enter his 
docket a judgment of his court for the amount confessed, 
with three dollars cost. If a transcript of such 
judgment filed with the district clerk, a copy of the 
statement must be filed with it. 
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B. The Promissor Note Itself Does Not Meet 
The Requirements of Rule 58 A e). 
Once these obvious deficiencies were pointed out to 
Lhe court below, the court, on its own motion, inquired whether 
or not the note itself was verified and signed by the 
Jefendants. Plaintiffs' counsel volunteered a statement that 
the note was verified while defendants' counsel offered that it 
was only notarized and even if it was verified it did not 
contain the statements required by Rule 58A(e). (T. 17). 
Thereafter, the court made the following finding: 
IT. 31). 
Court finds that the note itself which was 
executed by the defendant and was verified 
and thus complies with the provisions of 
Rule 58 A(e), sworn to by him, and it has 
the sum certain which will be due under 
certain conditions as set out in the note. 
(T. 31). 
See also Paragraph 2 of that order of the court 
denying defendants' motion to set aside the judgment. 
An examination of the note itself will reveal it was 
not sworn and not verified by the defendants. The makers of 
the note simply acknowledged before a notary public that they, 
in fact, executed the note.
2 
2 The promissory note is dated February 27, 1983, and 
was filed with the clerks office on March 3, 1983, at 4:45 P.M. 
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Furthermore, even if the note were verified, it would 
not meet the requirements of Rule 58A{e). The note does not 
indicate that any sum is "justly'' due or to become due nor does 
it concisely state the claim giving rise to any "continyent 
liability''. Nor, does it "authorize the entry of judgment for 
a specified sum" unless "the amount of principle, interest and 
other cost incurred in obtaining said judgment" is a specified 
sum. 
Even if the note did meet the requirements of Rule 
58A(e), judgment would still not have been entered in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 58A(e). The judgment 
itself was filed March 3, 1983, at 3:20 P.M. The note was 
filed March 3, 1983, at 4:45 P.M. - after the judyment by 
confession. Rule 58A(e) specifies that the judgment will be 
filed upon presentation of the verified statement. This 
clearly did not take place. The note was filed well after the 
judgment was filed. It also does not appear that the clerk (or 
the judge) "endorsed upon the statement . . a judgment of the 
court for the amount confessed" as is required by Rule 58A(e). 
II. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID BECAUSE IT DENIED DEFENDANTS 
THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED 
BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
It is well settled that people have due process rights 
to notice and hearing prior to civil adjudications. However, 
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1t is equally clear that such due process rights are subject to 
waiver. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated "due 
process rights of notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment 
are subject to waiver". D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 
U.S. 174, 31 L. Ed. 2d 124, 133, 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972). See 
also, Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 31 L. Ed. 2d 138, 92 s. 
Ct. 767, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1049, 31 L. Ed. 2d 592, 92 
S. Ct. 1303 (1972). 
As defendants counsel pointed out to the lower court, 
the United States Supreme Court has not clearly ruled on the 
standard by which waiver of these due process rights is to be 
determined. (T. 15-16). Nevertheless, in Overmyer, supra, two 
iustices - Douglas and Marshall - out of a seven justice 
court
3 
indicated that the standard for waiver of due process 
rights in the civil context was the same as in criminal cases: 
"it must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made"; "an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege". The 
0ther 5 participating justices gave no clear ruling on what the 
standard was but stated: 
Even if for present purposes, we assume that 
the standard for waiver in a corporate 
property right case of its kind is the same 
standard applicable to waiver in a criminal 
3 Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate. 
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proceeding, that is, that it be voluntary, 
knowingly and intelligently made. (citations 
omitted), 'an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege', 
(citations omitted), and even if as the 
court has said in the civl area, 'we do not 
presume acquiescence', (citations omitted), 
the standard was fully satisfied here. 
31 L. Ed. 2d at 134. 
Despite the absence of a clear ruling by the Supreme 
Court, it appears the lower federal courts all express the view 
that the standard for waiver of due process rights in the civil 
context is the same as in criminal cases: 
While the United States Supreme Court has 
not yet authoritatively decided whether the 
same waiver or standard applies in civil 
cases as in criminal cases, the lower 
federal courts have universally applied the 
same standard. See, ~· Gonzalez v. 
County of Hidalgo, Texas, 489 F.2d 1043, 
1046, (5th Cir. 1973); American Consumer, 
Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 427 F. 
Supp. 591 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Thus, in order 
to waive a right, there must be an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right 
or privilege. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 
387, 404, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L. Ed 2d 
424 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
464, 58 S. Ct. 1049, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461 
( 1938). 
Hernandez v. Casillas, 520 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Tex. 1981). See 
also, Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 94 
(5th Cir. 1981); Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. 
Minn. 1976); Garner v. Tri-State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 
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Jal (E.D. Mich. 1974) and other authorities cited in these 
ui.ses. The same views have been expressed by state supreme 
~ourts. Telephonic Inc. v. Rosenbloom, 88 N.M. 532, 543 P.2d 
825 ( 1976). 
In determining whether or not a waiver has taken 
pl~ce, courts consider all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances including the relative bargaining position of the 
parties, the sophistication of the parties and whether or not 
the waiver was specifically bargained for. 
Furthermore: 
The Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Sheven, 
(citation omitted), and in numerous other 
cases, (footnote omitted) has clearly 
indicated that a heavy burden must be born 
by the party claiming that a 'voluntary, 
intelligent, and knowing' contractual waiver 
has occurred 
Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, Texas, 489 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th 
Cir. 1973). As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in 
Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 946 
!oth Cir. 1981): 
Courts, 'indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver'. Aetna Ins. Co. 
v. Kennecy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S. Ct. 89, 
812, 81 L. Ed. 1177 (1937) to be effective, 
a waiver 'not only must be voluntary but 
must be knowing, intelligent, (and) done 
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with sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances anu likely consequences.' 
Brady v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 742, 7-tti, 20 L. t:d. 2c! 747, 9u s. 
Ct. 1463, 1469 (1970). See also, Garner v. Tri-State 
Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (l::.D. '1ich. 197.+) and 
cases cited therein. The buruen of proof for establishing that 
a waiver took place falls on the party asserting the waiver. 
Even if a party effectively waives this right: 
Constitutional due process requires that a 
judicial determination of waiver must 
preceed entry of judgment. Osmond v. 
Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 (D. Del. 1972). 
The most current line of cases involving 
cognovit notes holds that, even in the 
context of a clear waiver of notice and 
opportunity to be heard, there must be a 
judicial determination as to whether the 
waiver was voluntary before judgment can be 
entered. See Virgin Island National Bank v. 
Tropical Ventures Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203, 
1205 (D.R.I. 1973); Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. 
Supp. 124, 127 (D. Del. 1972); Scott v. 
Danaher, 343, F. Supp. 1272, 1278 (N.D. 111. 
1972); but see Tunheim v. Bowman, 366 F. 
Supp. 1392,~94 (D. Nev. 1972). 
Hernandez v. Casillas, 52'.J F. Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Tex 1981). 
As the court stated in Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 
( D. Del. l 9 7 2) : 
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Since a signed cognovit note does not 
constitute proof of an effective waiver, a 
hearing and judicial determination are 
necessary, and an understanding and 
voluntary waiver must be shown prior to 
entry of judgment. Unless a hearing is 
conducted on the waiver question before the 
judgment is entered, an alleged debtor will 
be deprived of his due process rights on 
every occasion when an effective waiver had 
not occurred upon the initial execution of 
the note. (Emphasis added). 
Given this information, one may well conclude not only 
that the entry of judgment in this case was unconstitutional, 
but that the Utah provisions governing confession of judgment 
are unconstitutional on their face. The Utah provisions allow 
Judgment to be entered by the clerk without ever consulting a 
JUdge. 4 This certainly does not allow for a judicial 
Jetermination of waiver prior to the entry of judgment. Unless 
Rule SSA(e) is read to require a verified statement signed by 
the actual debtor, these provisions most certainly are 
~nconstitutional: judgment could be entered with no evidence 
that a waiver has taken place. 
The record in this case clearly reveals that no 
nearing was held prior to the entry of judgment to determine 
4 Counsel does not wish to mislead the Court: judgment 
1'1 this case was entered by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of 
the Third District Court. Nevertheless if entered pursuant to 
• statute which is unconstitutional on its face, the judgment 
in this case should be void. 
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whether or not the defendants in this case had waived their 
right to due process. The only thing in the record that would 
remotely suggest that defendants had waived this right is the 
promissory note executed by the defendants. This promissory . 
note was not even filed until after the judgment had been 
entered! Clearly then, there was no judicial determination 
that a knowing and voluntary waiver had taken place prior to 
the entry of judgment as is required by the United States 
Constitution. There was certainly no evidence on which a court 
could have based such a conclusion. 
The uncontroverted affidavit of Laird Gogins indicates 
that his prior counsel informed him judgment could not be taken 
against him or Free-Wing Turbine without the issuance of 
process and notice and hearing. There was virtually no 
evidence before the court to suggest that defendants' right to 
procedural due process was a known right which was 
deliberately, knowingly and intelligently waived. 
It is well established that a conviction of a criminal 
defendant entered upon his or her guilty plea is 
unconstitutional if the guilty plea is entered upon misleading 
advice of counsel. This is because a guilty plea which is 
entered on advice of counsel is not a voluntary and intelligent 
waiver of the defendants due process rights to trial by his 
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reers, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc., if the defendant 
wds misled by his attorney. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 25 L. Ed 2d 763, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970); Pedicord v. 
Swenson, 304 F. Supp 393 (W.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 92 
(8th Cir. 1970). There is nothing in the record which 
controverts the affidavit of Laird Gogins which indicates that 
his previous counsel advised that no judgment could be taken 
against defendants without notice and hearing. The case law 
makes it clear that there could have been no valid waiver of 
iefendants due process rights in such circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the lower court found the defendants 
understanding that the judgment could not be taken against them 
without notice and hearing was nothing more than a "unilateral 
mistake of law" which did not justify lifting the judgment. 
5 
III. THE JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION DENIED DEFENDANTS THEIR 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED 
BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The right to due process of law is guaranteed in the 
Constitution of the State of Utah in Article l, Sections 7 and 
11. Section 7 states: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
5 (T. 32); Paragraph 5 of the courts order denying 
defendants to set aside the judgment. 
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Section 11 states: 
All courts shall be open and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property, or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this state, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
(Emphasis Added). 
Both of these provisions underscore the basic notion 
that people are entitled to their day in court before a 
judgment allowing others to deprive them of their property may 
be entered against them. The entry of judgment without notice 
and hearing is violative of the most basic and fundamental 
rights recognized by Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
Defendants can find no decision of this court 
indicating whether or not this state constitutional right can 
be waived. However, it seems reasonable to believe that almost 
any right can be waived in the proper circumstances. The 
appropriate question is by what standard do we determine 
whether or not such a waiver has taken place. Defendants 
suggested to the lower court and suggest to this Court as well 
that waiving these state due process rights is at least as 
difficult as is the waiving of federal due process rights. 
Defendants urge this court to rule that a judicial 
determination that a waiver has taken place must be made before 
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, Judgment by confession can be entered and that a presumption 
exists that no such waiver has taken place and that the burden 
of proof regarding a waiver lies with the party asserting the 
waiver. If the court adopts this standard, the judgment 
against the defendants must fall. There was no judicial 
determination that a waiver had taken place prior to the entry 
of judgment in this case. Furthermore, the uncontroverted 
Affidavit of Laird Gogins indicates that he and Free-Wing 
Turbin Corp. clearly did not know and comprehend that they were 
waiving their rights to notice and hearing. 
IV. THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
RULE 60(b)(7) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT 
The record below clearly reveals that defendant sought 
to have the judgment set aside under Rule 60(b)(7) even if the 
court had determined that it had been legally and 
constitutionally entered. (T. 3, 4, 19, 20, 32). Rule 60(b) ( 7) 
reads as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order or proceeding 
for the following reasons: ••. (7) Any 
other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
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Defendants submit that the nature of the judgment in 
this case together with the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the case clearly indicate that it is in the interest of justice 
to lift the judgment. The judgment grows out of a factual 
situation which has led to two more lawsuits involving these 
parties wherein both sides pray for judgment against the other 
for sums in excess of Sl,000,000. The note on which the 
judgment was entered and the agreement that went along with the 
note are connected and wound up inextricably in the other 
proceedings. The doctrine of compulsory joinder of claims 
dictates that any claims plaintiffs have on the note should be 
joined with the other claims plaintiffs have asserted in the 
other litigation. Defendants have asserted claims against 
plaintiffs in the other litigation which by all right should 
have been compulsory counterclaims in this action and would 
have been brought in this action had defendants been given the 
opportunity to do so. Furthermore, if plaintiffs are allowed 
to acquire the stock of Laird B. Gogins in defendant Free-Wing 
Turbine Corp. by virtue of the judgment in this case, they 
would have a controlling interest in Free-Wing Turbine Corp. 
and could cause numerous actions against plaintiffs in the 
other two lawsuits to be summarily dismissed. 
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Before the lower court, the defendants suggested that 
~ confession of judgment should be set aside at least as easily 
as a default judgment. 6 The Affidavit of Laird Gogins 
indicates that he has defenses to the action on the note and 
claims against plaintiffs which are in the nature of compulsory 
counterclaims. This certainly would be grounds for setting 
aside a default judgment. If it is grounds for setting aside a 
default judgment, it ought to be grounds for setting aside a 
Judgment by confession because defendants in this case did not 
even have the opportunity to answer a complaint after process 
had issued and they had been duly served. 
Farseeing the possibility that the court might not 
adopt the same standard for setting aside judgments by 
confession as for judgments by default, defendant's counsel 
discussed other possible standards. At least one court held 
that judgments by confession should be set aside if the 
judgment debtor can present evidence sufficient to withstand a 
motion for a directed verdict. Livingston v. Rebman, 169 Ohio 
St. 104, 158 N.E.2d 366 (1959). Defendant's counsel urged that 
this standard was too high. Of course, defendants urge that 
such a judgment should be set aside in the same circumstances 
6 See defendant's memorandum of points and 
'uthorities in support of their motion to lift the judgment. 
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as a default judgment; such judgment should be set aside even 
more easily. Below, plaintiff's counsel volunteered that this 
was the case in Colorado. (T. 24). In the event the Court 
fails to adopt that standard, defendants urge that the 
presentation of evidence on which a motion for summary judgment 
could not be granted should cause a court to set such a 
judgment aside. 
Below, defendant's counsel and defendant's affidavit 
indicated that defendants believe that they have defenses and 
that defendants at least ought to be entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing regarding those defenses before their motion could can 
be denied. (T. 19). No evidentiary hearing was had and 
defendant's motion was denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants submit that it is clear judgment was not 
entered in this case in accordance with the applicable statutes 
and that for a judgment by confession to stand the statutes 
must be strictly adhered to. It is equally clear that the 
entry of judgment in this case denied defendants their right to 
due process of law as guaranteed by both the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution. The surrounding facts 
and circumstances also justify the lifting of the judgment in 
this case and having the merits adjudicated in related 
proceedings. For these reasons, defendants pray that the Court 
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9~cate the judgment entered against them in this case and 
[.1rther direct that defendants be given their day in court 
before any judgment may be entered against them. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this ~- day of July, 1983. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
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Duke F. Wahlquist 
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Paul Franklin Farr, Esq. 
CARMAN & FARR, P.C. 
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